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Abstract 
Issues in corporate governance develop according to an identifiable process. 
Using the influence model of Jones and Pollitt (2002) we compare the conduct 
of and influences on the investigations leading to the Higgs Review (2003) and 
the Cadbury Report (1992). We suggest that while there are similarities in the 
investigations there are important differences arising from the review process 
adopted, the role of the government, the background of the leaders of the 
investigations and the influence of academics. These differences have had 
important implications for the effectiveness of the implementation of the 
conclusions of the Higgs Review. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Issues in corporate governance do not arise in a vacuum but rather from an 
identifiable process. Over the past 12 years the UK has initiated a series of 
investigations into ways to improve the corporate governance of UK listed 
companies. These investigations have been high profile, lead by an experienced 
individual who has given his name to the final report. Thus we have seen the 
Cadbury Report (1992), Greenbury Report (1995), Hampel Report (1998) and 
Turnbull Report (1999) to name but four. Associated with them there have been 
specialist reviews such as those led by Paul Myners (DTI, 1996, HMT, 2001) 
into institutional investment. In addition the UK Government subsequently 
completed a long running investigation associated with the Company Law 
Review (DTI, 2001). Although this was not headed by a high profile individual 
it did share many of the detailed characteristics of earlier investigations – a 
committee structure reflecting diverse stakeholder interests and a process of 
significant consultation on the way to a set of final recommendations. 
 
Jones and Pollitt (2002a) demonstrated that it is possible to systemically 
characterise and analyse the process of these investigations in a way which not 
only identifies who was influencing them but also allows predictions to be made 
as to their ultimate effectiveness. Our model of influence characterised the 
different stages of a corporate governance investigation and the influence 
different groups exert at different stages of the process. We also suggested that 
there were important ways in which different influences were reflected in the 
final recommendations and on their eventual effectiveness. 
 
Jones and Pollitt (2002a) examined and compared five important corporate 
governance investigations since 1990: those that resulted in the Cadbury, 
Greenbury, Hampel, and Turnbull Reports and the Company Law Review. This 
paper applies a similar methodology to allow analysis of the influences and 
hence likely effectiveness of the Higgs Review that was published in January 
2003. We do this by directly contrasting the factors behind the development of 
the Higgs Review and the earlier Cadbury Report. 
 
Our analysis proceeds as follows. First we lay out our earlier model of 
influences on corporate governance, then we discuss the reasons to use the 
Cadbury Report as a point of comparison with the Higgs Review. Second we 
review the conduct of the Higgs Review and the Cadbury Report in turn. 
Finally, we highlight the key differences in the influences between the two 
reports and offer some thoughts on the implications of these differences. 
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2.  A model of influence on issues in corporate governance 
 
The UK approach to dealing with issues of corporate governance has been to set 
up a committee to look into them. This committee operates against a 
background of a business ethics environment where there are a number of 
potentially important stakeholders, all or some of whom may take or be offered 
an interest in the issues. These stakeholders may be labelled as influencers. 
Jones and Pollitt (2002a) identified four broad groups of influencers: business, 
authorities, public opinion and exogenous factors.  
 
Business refers to Corporates, Non-financial stakeholders such as trade unions, 
Financial stakeholders such as major shareholding institutions and professionals 
such as accountants and lawyers. These business stakeholders may exert their 
influence via trade bodies such as the Confederation of British Industry, the 
Institute of Directors or the Institute of Chartered Accountants and the Law 
Society.  
 
Authorities refers to Government officials and ministers and regulatory bodies 
such as the Bank of England or the Stock Exchange.  
 
Public Opinion refers to the Media activity, NGOs campaigning on corporate 
governance such as Pensions and Investment Research Centre (PIRC) and 
Popular Feeling as represented by the majority popular opinion. Popular feeling, 
NGOs and Media strongly complement one another.  
 
Exogenous Factors or Events refers to the role of high profile scandals (often 
related to poor macroeconomic conditions). 
 
Following an examination of other types of business ethics issues in addition to 
corporate governance Jones and Pollitt (2002b) further divide influencers into 
two types: Type A and Type B. Type A influencers are those with the ability to 
make issues an issue. They are proactive in getting the debate started. Type A 
influencers include:  
 
•  Events 
•  NGOs 
•  Media 
•  Popular Feeling 
•  Politicians 
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Type B influencers, on the other hand, are those who rarely initiate debates but 
are forced to respond to debates initiated by the Type A influencers. Type B 
influencers include: 
 
•  the government executive 
•  International Institutions 
•  Regulators 
•  Professions 
•  Investment Analysts 
•  Investment Institutions 
•  Corporates  
•  Non-financial business stakeholders 
 
For each of the investigations into corporate governance they examine, Jones 
and Pollitt (2002a) characterise the key stages in the development of the final 
report and assess the size of the influence (high, medium or low) of each of the 
influencers on each stage. They suggest that the stages of the investigation are:  
 
•  initial interest 
•  the formation of the committee 
•  the writing of the terms of reference 
•  the deliberation of the committee (including how comments were 
handled) 
•  the compilation of the report 
•  the presentation of findings 
•  the subsequent debate 
•  the implementation phase 
 
For the five investigations examined, Jones and Pollitt (2002a) found that the 
quality of the process of the investigation had a very significant effect on the 
outcome, both in terms of the content of the report and the subsequent 
effectiveness of its implementation. In common with other business ethics 
issues, three phases in the development of the issues in corporate governance 
can be identified:  
 
1. an  awareness phase during which people become aware of a problem to 
be addressed;  
2. an education phase during which the problem is analysed and solutions 
are investigated; and  
3. an  implementation phase during which chosen solutions are implemented.  
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Type A influencers are very influential in the awareness phase and much less 
involved in education and implementation, whereas Type B influencers are not 
involved much in awareness, somewhat involved in education and very 
involved in implementation. For instance in the Greenbury Report investigation 
into executive pay, the Media (and not Corporates) were a prime influence in 
the awareness phase but the implementation phase had nothing to do with the 
media and relied heavily on corporate reporting. 
 
Our earlier investigation highlighted the importance of the Cadbury Committee 
investigation and Report as a model of how to manage a Corporate Governance 
investigation. The Cadbury Report stands out among its successors as having a 
high quality process of investigation in the face of varied and strong influencer 
interest and in coming to and implementing radical yet realistic proposals.  The 
quality of the Cadbury Report’s conclusions and implementations lies in the fact 
that the report is internationally recognised as having been seminal in the 
development of corporate governance in the UK and elsewhere. It originated the 
self-regulation approach whereby reporting of compliance was part of the listing 
requirements for public companies. The emphasis on the board as a focal 
decision point could be said to be led by Cadbury, as could be the emphasis on 
appropriately constituted board sub-committees (remuneration, audit and 
nomination), independent non-executive directors and the separation of 
chairman and chief executive positions. Many of the recommendations of the 
Cadbury Code have been incorporated into the OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance (OECD, 1999) and into other national Corporate Governance 
Codes (Cadbury, 2000). 
 
Jones and Pollitt (2002a) find some clear differences between the influences on, 
and the process of, Company Law Review and the earlier Cadbury Report.  The 
Labour government (reflecting its concerns while in Opposition) was much 
more involved in the initiation of the Review. The process was slow and 
deliberate in its consultations. The outcome was consensual. While the Cadbury 
Report initiated an era of self-regulation the impact of the Company Law 
Review seems likely to be a detailed piece of legislation that will significantly 
change the substance of the law towards corporate governance. However the 
outcome of the review was significantly less radical than originally thought due 
to the consensual nature of the way it was conducted. In particular the ultimate 
legal accountability of firms to shareholders rather than a wider group of 
stakeholders – in line with Cadbury  - was affirmed. The major impact may well 
be the legal requirement to produce an Operating and Financial Report (OFR) 
which will include corporate governance and social responsibility compliance 
information (Parkinson, 2002). 
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3.  The conduct of the Higgs Review 
 
After a period of quiet in the media and popular interest in corporate 
governance issues (which Jones and Pollitt (2002a) date from 1997 in the UK), 
the subject has once again become a hotly debated one. This renewed interest 
dates from summer 2001 when there began a series of high profile scandals – 
Enron, WorldCom, Tyco - of large US based companies in which poor 
corporate governance seemed to be a factor. Media comment and the loss of 
public trust in companies and the desire by governments to be seen to take 
action created pressure for a review, if only to check in the UK that all had been 
done to reduce the risk of ‘it happening here’. 
 
In the US there was swift government action via the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation
1 
in mid 2002 and the new NYSE listing rules also in mid 2002, and there have 
been prosecutions of many of those operating at top levels in the failed 
companies such as Enron, starting in November 2001. In this environment the 
UK Government has wanted to be seen to react quickly to the crisis but also to 
head-off the potential consequences of US regulation and legislation for 
companies of British origin that are listed on the NYSE. It seems probable that 
there has been behind the scenes negotiation at an inter-governmental level to 
determine the extent to which the US measures should apply to the UK and 
other foreign owned companies. 
 
A mainstay of the UK response to the corporate governance fallout from the US 
was to set up an independent review – to be led by Derek Higgs - of the role and 
effectiveness of non-executive directors.
2 This was initiated by the Secretary of 
State for Trade and Industry and the Chancellor, in April 2002. At the time 
Derek Higgs was a non-executive director, executive director and institutional 
investor. Higgs was an executive director of Prudential plc, and a non-executive 
director of Allied Irish Bank plc, the British Land Company, Jones Lang La 
Salle Inc. and Egg. He was also a senior advisor of UBS Warburg Group. He 
was chairman of Partnerships UK, a now privatised government agency 
responsible for fostering PPP and PFI. He was also a non-executive member of 
the London Regional Transport Body, responsible for privatising London 
Underground. He was a member of the Financial Reporting Council, a 
Department of Trade and Industry committee to oversee financial reporting and 
company accounting, and a government advisory committee on business and the 
environment. 
 
Derek Higgs’ terms of reference (as reviewer) were ‘to build and publish an 
accurate picture of the status quo; to lead a debate on these issues, especially in 
the business and financial worlds; and to make any recommendations - to  6
Government or others - which the reviewer thinks appropriate.’ (DTI Press 
Release P/2002/234, 15 April 2002).  
 
The detailed terms of reference were to assess: 
 
•  ‘the population of non-executive directors in the UK - who are they, how 
are they appointed, how the pool might be widened, etc; 
•  their "independence"; 
•  their effectiveness; 
•  accountability; their relationship - actual and potential – with institutional 
investors; 
•  issues relating to non-executive directors' remuneration; 
•  the role of the Combined Code; 
•  what, if anything, could be done - by individual boards, by institutional 
investors, by the Government or otherwise – to strengthen the quality, 
independence and effectiveness of non-executive directors.’ 
 
(DTI Press Release P/2002/234, 15 April 2002) 
 
Alongside the review, the Co-ordinating Group on Audit and Accounting Issues 
(CGAA) was set up in February 2002 to review the UK audit and accounting 
regime.
3 At its interim report, published in July 2002, the CGAA commissioned 
a group, chaired by Sir Robert Smith, to develop existing Code guidance for 
audit committees.   
 
In line with its terms of reference, the Higgs Review commissioned three 
substantial pieces of primary research.  
 
First, there was a detailed study on the size, composition and membership of the 
board and committees of 2,200 UK listed companies as at July 2002 and the age 
and gender of their directors. This study builds a detailed picture of the 
population of non-executive directors.
4 The study used data supplied by the 
Hemscott Group Ltd and was undertaken by the Higgs Review team.  
 
Second, 605 executive directors, non-executive directors, and chairmen of UK 
listed companies were surveyed in August 2002. This study was conducted by 
the opinion poll organisation, MORI.
5  
 
Finally, academics from Leeds University Business School and the Judge 
Institute at the University of Cambridge reported on in-depth interviews with 40 
directors of FTSE 350 boards.
6 This research analysed the behaviours that  7
promote effectiveness and looks in detail at behavioural dynamics inside and 
outside the boardroom.  
 
Higgs launched a consultation exercise on June 7
th 2002, which closed on 6
th 
September 2002. During this period 250 responses were received. The Higgs 
Review was not supported by a conventional committee of stakeholders as such 
but by two senior civil servants (one from the DTI and one from the Treasury) 
and a number of more junior civil servants.  The Review was co-ordinated from 
the DTI. During the period of the Review there were calls, among other things, 
for the number of non-executive directorships held by one individual to be 
limited
7, for there to be more training for non-executive directors
8 and more 
intervention from shareholders to discipline under-performing boards
9. 
 
The Higgs Review and the Smith Review reported simultaneously on 20
th 
January 2003 (Higgs, 2003, and Smith, 2003) with the CGAA reporting on 29
th 
January (CGAA, 2003). The final Higgs report contains a large number of 
recommendations relating to:  
 
•  the structure of the board 
•  the role and other commitments of the chair 
•  the role of the non-executive director 
•  the recruitment and appointment procedures to the board 
•  induction and professional development of directors 
•  board tenure and time commitment 
•  remuneration 
•  resignation procedures 
•  audit and remuneration committees 
•  board liability  
•  relationships with shareholders 
 
Among the more controversial proposals are the limitations which would be 
placed on the number of chairmanships which could be held by one individual, 
the tough definition of independence (which would rule out a CEO becoming 
chair), the specification of senior independent director who would  ‘be available 
to shareholders’ and the limits on non-executive director tenure. 
 
Higgs recommended that the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) and Financial 
Services Authority process his review’s proposals rapidly. The government 
endorsed this urgency.
10 The FRC announced that it was to take forward the 
recommendations of both the Higgs and the Smith reports for changes to the 
Combined Code on Corporate Governance by 1 July 2003.
11  8
 
The debate that followed the publication of the Review became extremely 
heated. Corporate interests such as the Confederation of British Industry (CBI)
12 
and the Institute of Directors
13, supported by numerous company chairmen (in 
particular those who had been CEOs of the same company)
14, criticised some of 
the key conclusions of the Review, while the National Association of Pension 
Funds (NAPF) emerged as a strong advocate for the suggested reforms
15. The 
critics were supported to some extent by the Financial Services Authority
16 and 
the Institute of Chartered Accountants for England and Wales (ICEAW)
17 and 
the Conservative Party
18. The ICEAW noted that while the Cadbury, Greenbury, 
Hampel and Turnbull reports combined produced 14 principles and 45 code 
points, the Higgs review added just 1 principle but 37 additional code points, 
fuelling the claim that the code was unduly prescriptive.
19 A couple of academic 
researchers even suggested that there was new evidence that boards with more 
independent directors were less effective than those with less.
20 The FRC, the 
body charged with incorporating the Higgs recommendations into the 
Combined Code, suggested that changes would only be made if a ‘fatal flaw’ 
could be detected in the recommendations.
21 Their own consultation on the 
Review was scheduled to end on 14
th April 2003, a date that proved so soon that 
the CBI had not time to get its response submitted by the deadline.
22  
 
Higgs and Smith presented their proposals on many occasions in the months 
following the publication of their reports. Over the course of the subsequent 
debate Higgs acknowledged that minor changes should be made, sometimes 
where there was opaque drafting
23. The role of the senior independent director 
in meetings with shareholders is an example of where clarification was 
accepted.  
 
Following the publication of the Review the CBI surveyed the views of 
chairmen on its conclusions
24. Business was uneasy about the prescriptive 
nature of the proposals, the fact that the Higgs’ consultation concentrated on 
data collection and that there was no consultation on the report in draft form and 
the time allowed for feedback was limited. The CBI surveyed 61 FTSE100 
chairmen, 82% of company chairmen agreed with the proposition that the role 
of the senior independent director undermined the role the chair and 87% did 
not think that a non-executive director chairing the nomination committee 
would strengthen the independence of the board. In addition 56% thought that 
non-executive directors meeting in the absence of the chair would not be useful 
for corporate governance and 50% did not think that disallowing the CEO from 
becoming chairman of the same company would lead to better board 
performance. The Government announced its support, in principle, for the 
Higgs proposals and reiterated that support in the face of criticism in March  9
2003.
25 The National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF), representing a 
significant part of the investment community, expressed its support.
26 The 
NAPF produced its own survey suggesting that only 25% of FTSE350 firms 
complied with the current Combined Code and hence that corporates had much 
to do to put their house in order. 
 
The FRC consultation on the Higgs recommendations resulted in 181 
submissions.
27 On 14
th May 2003, in response to the unexpectedly widespread 
criticism, the FRC set up a working group of FRC members to produce a 
revised draft of the Combined Code which reflected the criticisms. This 
working group included Derek Higgs, Robert Smith and representatives from 
both the ICEAW and the CBI, as well as the investment community. The FRC 
appeared to have concluded by May 2003 that, contrary to the Higgs Review: 
the chairman should be allowed to chair the nomination committee; that no limit 
should be put on re-election of non-executive directors; that companies outside 
the FTSE350 should not have to have at least half independent directors; and 
that some of the provisions in the draft were more akin to principles.
28 These 
changes were included in the new Combined Code published on the 23
rd July 
2003 (FRC, 2003) by the Financial Reporting Council due for implementation 
in company reports from 1
st November 2003.
29 After several months of heated 




4.  The conduct of the Cadbury Report 
 
In May 1991, the Financial Reporting Council, the London Stock Exchange and 
the accountancy profession set up a committee on the Financial Aspects of 
Corporate Governance.
31 The chairman of the Financial Reporting Council, to 
chair the committee, approached Sir Adrian Cadbury.  
 
Sir Adrian chaired the Cadbury Schweppes from 1965 until 1989, during which 
he developed a participative corporate management structure and edited one of 
the first corporate charters of Business Principles. He was a Director of the 
Bank of England from 1970 to 1994, and founded PRO NED, a Bank of 
England-backed organization aimed at professionalizing non-executive 
directors. In 1990 he published a book entitled ‘The Company Chairman’. 
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The terms of reference for this committee, which Sir Adrian Cadbury himself 
drew up, were: 
 
‘To consider the following issues in relation to the financial reporting and 
accountability and to make recommendations on good practice: 
 
a)  the responsibilities of executive and non-executive directors for the 
reviewing and reporting on performance to shareholders and other 
financially interested parties; and the frequency, clarity and form in 
which information should be provided; 
b)  the case for audit committees of the board, including their composition 
and role; 
c)  the principal responsibilities of auditors and the extent and value of 
audit; 
d)  the links between shareholders, boards, and auditors; 
e)  any other relevant matters.’  
 
(Cadbury Report, 1992, Appendix 1, p.61) 
 
The committee was formed with members drawn from the CBI, the accountancy 
profession, finance directors, academia, the Bank of England, the Stock 
Exchange, the Institute of Directors, institutional investors, and the Law 
Society. The Department of Trade and Industry provided a secretary to the 
committee, who acted as their observer.  
 
Cadbury did some personal research into board practice and corporate 
governance in other countries, particularly those in the United States. The 
committee published an interim report in May 1992. The interim report attracted 
various types of criticism. From the business community, there was the charge 
that the system was too bureaucratic. The committee received more than 200 
submissions during the initial consultation phase and the public consultation 
following the interim report. 
 
The CBI, in particular, fought for the removal of the requirement that 
compliance with the code should be part of the listing requirements for the 
Stock Exchange. Cadbury stressed that those who do not understand business 
well, and who had a more doctrinaire approach, would take action unless 
companies were seen to do this. Legislation was a real alternative. Although the 
CBI leadership was critical of the code, Cadbury won the support of the wider 
CBI membership at the CBI annual conference in November 1992. Eventually, 
he won the debate with the CBI leadership over the need to report compliance 
with the code.  11
The final version of the Cadbury report appeared at the beginning of December 
1992. This was similar to the draft report except that the final report responded 
to CBI concerns about the role of non-executives as policemen, by playing 
down the distinction between them and executive directors. There was an 
explicit distancing of the report from its earlier support for two-tier boards. 
There was widespread, if cautious, support for the report in boardrooms and the 
City. As one eminent City figure was quoted as saying ‘You can’t be against it, 
you have to be for it.’
32 The Government reaction was positive, with the 
Corporate Affairs Minister labelling it ‘an authoritative statement of what needs 
to be done in a crucial area’.
33  
 
The main recommendations of the Cadbury report were:  
 
•  a division of responsibilities at the head of the company to ensure that no 
one individual has powers of decision 
•  a majority of non-executive directors to be independent 
•  at least three non-executives on the audit committee 
•  a majority of non-executives on the remuneration committee 
•  non-executives should be selected by the whole board 
 
We contrast these directly with the Higgs Review conclusions in Table 1 below. 
 
 
Table 1.  Summary of key areas recommendations of each investigation 
 
  CADBURY REPORT  HIGGS REVIEW 
Chair  No one person with power of 
decision 
Chair, of only one company, not 
ex or current CEO 
Compliance Listing  rules 
Comply or explain 
Listing rules 
Comply or explain 
Independent Non-exec 
directors (INEDs) 
Majority NEDs to be independent Narrow  definition  independent 
NEDs (INEDs) 
Audit and Remuneration 
Committees 
At least 3 NEDs on Audit 
Committee, majority NEDs on 
Remuneration Committee 
At least 3 INEDs on 
Remuneration Committee 
Nomination Committee  Selection of NEDs matter for 
whole board 
Wider recruitment, chaired by 
INED, majority INEDs 
Process  -  Codes of Best Practice 
Relationship with 
Shareholders 
- Senior  independent  director 
Director development  -  Induction, appraisal, training 
 
Sources: Cadbury Report (1992, pp.58-59), Higgs Review (2003, pp.5-10) 
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5.  Reviewing the influences on each investigation 
 
Here we contrast the Cadbury Report and the Higgs Review based on the 
theoretical model of Jones and Pollitt (2002a,b) described earlier in the paper. 
This compares the involvement of Type A and Type B influencers distinguished 
in that model. The Type A influencers are involved earlier in the awareness 
phase, whereas the Type B influencers are more important in the subsequent 
education and implementation phases. We use a list of influencers that include 
all those identified in Jones and Pollitt (2002b). We specify four levels of 
influence: - (or none) discernible, low, moderate and high. For each influencer 
we compare their influence on the Cadbury Report and Higgs Review. Our 
observations about influence are based on analysis of media reports and 
interviews with key players. 
 
  
Table 2.  Comparison between the Type A influencers on Cadbury and Higgs 
 
  CADBURY REPORT  HIGGS REVIEW 
Events  High due to scandals in Awareness  High in Awareness due to scandals and 
stock prices 
NGOs  -  Moderate in Education via Centre for 
Tomorrow’s Company and Transparency 
International 
Media  High in Awareness and Moderate in 
Implementation 
High in Awareness and Low in 
Implementation? 
Popular Feeling  High in Awareness and Low in 
Implementation 
High in Awareness, Low in 
Implementation? 
Politicians  High in Awareness and Low in 
Implementation 




Table 2 summarises our observations on the influences on the Cadbury and 
Higgs investigations. There are some clear similarities. High profile corporate 
failures are important triggers for both of the investigations. As a result media 
interest, popular feeling and individual politicians are influential in raising the 
issues that bring about the investigations. The discernible differences are that 
while the Cadbury Report had no identifiable influence from NGOs (including 
no representation on the Cadbury Committee) there was some input to the Higgs 
Review from some specialist NGOs in the corporate governance area. This 
probably reflects the fact that in the aftermath of Cadbury and the interest it 
generated in the area there has been the development of some sophisticated 
NGOs. The Centre for Tomorrow’s Company began in 1996
34, while 
Transparency International began in 1993.
35 
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Table 3.  Comparison between the Type B influencers on Cadbury and Higgs  
 
  CADBURY REPORT  HIGGS REVIEW 
Government Executive  Low  High, strong Treasury and DTI 
influence 
International Institutions  -  High, US Legislation, 
International Accounting 
Conventions 
Regulators  High via Financial Reporting 
Council and Stock Exchange 
High, via co-ordination with 
Financial Reporting Council 
Smith Review 
Professions  High, represented on committee  Moderate, made submissions 
Investment analysts  -  - 
Investing Institutions  High initially but not important in 
Implementation 
High, via Higgs background and 
submissions 
Corporates  Low in Education, High in 
Implementation 
Low initially, made submissions, 
High in reaction to Review 
Non financial 
stakeholders 




Table 3 summarises the Type B influencers impact on the two investigations. 
The interesting observation about Type B influence is the marked difference in 
the influence pattern between the two investigations. The government had little 
to do with the Cadbury Report whereas there was strong government interest in 
the Higgs Review. This may well reflect the fact that the Labour Party has more 
of an ideological commitment to corporate governance reform than the 
Conservative Party did in government in 1991-92 and the spur of the perceived 
need for a UK government response to the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation in the 
US. There is also a strong international element to corporate governance in the 
Higgs Review that probably reflects the growing reality of the interrelationship 
between national regulatory regimes. There is also much less of a formal role 
for the accountancy and law professions under the Higgs Review (though Higgs 
himself is a Chartered Accountant).  
 
Differences exist in the role of corporates and investing institutions. Corporates 
were relatively unimportant in the education phase of the Cadbury Report but 
very important in its implementation, while the reverse was true for investing 
institutions. However the Higgs Review relies much more heavily on 
encouraging an active role for financial institutions (via their use of the senior 
independent director) for effective implementation. Non-financial stakeholders 
exert no discernible influence on the Cadbury Report while they did actively 
make submissions to the Higgs Review.
36 We should also note that the 
publication of three associated papers with the Higgs Review (there was no 
supporting material published with the Cadbury Report) indicates additional  14
influences. In particular it suggests that there is now a role for academic 
research in corporate governance investigations. 
 
 
6.  Conclusions 
 
The Cadbury Report was a model of how to conduct a corporate governance 
investigation. The process of investigation had a number of desirable features: 
 
1.  a visionary chair who energetically promoted his recommendations; 
2.  a committee which reflected the main stakeholders; 
3.  a draft report and process of consultation; and 
4.  a final report whose recommendations were widely accepted. 
 
It seems clear that the Higgs Review did not feature 2 and 3 and that it was 
almost inevitable that there would be problems achieving 4. The reasons for 
these differences in process were probably to do with the sense of urgency 
associated with the problem and the experience with the long drawn out 
Company Law Review which lasted three and a half years. The Review was 
largely conducted by Higgs himself, supported by two senior civil servants. 
Higgs is credited as the author while the Cadbury Report is authored by the 
Cadbury Committee. Clearly something is lost if reviews are not subject to 
review by other members of a committee. Many of the specific 
recommendations of the Review are extremely similar to those already 
published by the Institute of Chartered Secretaries and Administrators (ICSA), 
the Hermes Asset Management and the Institute of Directors. This may well 
reflect the academic approach to the investigation, drawing systematically on 
other sources, rather than the reflections of experience represented by the 
Cadbury Committee. Such an approach, while valid, requires a period of 
post-investigation consultation before implementation. 
 
A major feature is the pervasive influence of government in the awareness, 
education and (potentially in the) implementation phases of the debate around 
the Higgs Review. The Review findings were endorsed by the Chancellor, and 
the government stated that it saw no reason for making substantial changes. 
Indeed the threat of legislation was explicit if the government was not happy 
with the outcome of the FRC review of the Combined Code.
37 It is not clear that 
it is desirable or efficient for the government (a natural Type B actor) to be so 
involved. The distinctive feature of the Cadbury Report was the low-key way 
that the government was involved.  The threat of legislation if the process failed 
was quasi-explicit and Cadbury alluded to it often. One consequence of  15
government involvement in the Higgs Review seems to have been a rushed 
review with insufficient consultation. 
 
The differing backgrounds of Cadbury and Higgs seems to be an important 
determinant of the differences in the recommendations of the two 
investigations. Cadbury was Chair of PRO NED, an organisation for the 
promotion of the use of non-executive directors, while Higgs was an Investment 
Banker based at the Prudential. It should hardly be surprising that the major 
recommendation of the Cadbury Report was the raising of the importance of 
non-executive directors on the board while the major recommendation of the 
Higgs Review is the strengthening of the channels of communication between 
shareholders and the board via the senior independent director. 
 
Over the course of time between the Cadbury Report and the Higgs Review it is 
interesting to note how sources of inspiration for the conduct of investigations 
has changed. Cadbury drew inspiration from US board structures and 
sub-committees while Higgs drew on academic and survey research and 
information from specialist NGOs. This partially reflects the growing academic 
respectability of corporate governance, the more technical nature of the subject 
and the decline in the attractiveness of the US model.    16
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